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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a recent essay, I analyzed the problematic way in which the 
criminal law on rape has evolved in the shadow of the mind/body 
dualism.1  This paper develops some of those arguments about consent, 
mind, and body in light of a recent focus, in several criminal 
jurisdictions, on cases where the complainant in a rape trial has allegedly 
given consent to sexual intimacy whilst intoxicated.  Although 
intoxication can result from the ingestion of drugs, alcohol, solvents or 
*I would like to thank Gillian Calder and Victor Tadros for their helpful and, as always, incisive 
comments on a previous draft of this paper, and the participants in the Research Committee on the 
Sociology of Law’s Working Group on Gender session “The Epistemology of Consent in Rape 
Law” at the joint conference of the Law and Society Association and the International Sociological 
Association, Berlin 2007, for critical discussion of the issues presented in this paper.  I would also 
like to thank members of the Schools of Law at the University of Edinburgh and the University of 
Dundee, as well as the University of Edinburgh Philosophy Society, who all engaged with earlier 
versions of this paper. 
 1. See Sharon Cowan, Choosing Freely: Theoretically Reframing the Concept of Consent, in 
CHOICE AND CONSENT: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS WITH LAW AND SUBJECTIVITY (Rosemary Hunter 
& Sharon Cowan eds., Routledge 2007) (Eng.). 
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other substances, this paper focuses, in the main, on the most commonly 
taken drug in Western societies – alcohol.2 
The paper explores the contemporary concerns surrounding issues 
of intoxicated consent in cases of rape, particularly as expressed in U.K. 
case law, statute, and government policy.  During the course of this 
paper, I will examine recent research on the problematic role of alcohol 
in sexual assault before going on to discuss specific policy and 
legislative responses to the problem of intoxicated consent.  I will also 
engage in a close reading of several recent rape cases in the U.K. in 
which the capacity of the intoxicated complainant to consent to sexual 
intimacy has been of central concern.  The paper deals only with actus 
reus aspects of how consent unfolds in rape cases, and in particular, 
what amounts to consent when a woman is extremely intoxicated to the 
point where her capacity to consent is in doubt. 
For ease of reference and because statistically most rapists are men 
and most of those who are raped are women, and because the cases 
analyzed herein involve assaults by men perpetrated upon women, I will 
refer to victims of rape as “she” and perpetrators as “he,” though I fully 
acknowledge that this does not capture the whole spectrum of 
possibilities within the category “sexual offenses.”3  I also will use the 
terms complainant and defendant, since much of the discussion focuses 
on English rape trials.  Furthermore, many of the issues discussed herein 
have relevance outside of rape context, for example, in relation to sexual 
assault generally, and may also be of significance in other offenses 
against the person.  However, for the purposes of this paper the analysis 
will concentrate on the paradigm sexual offense of rape. 
A complainant’s intoxication can impact consent in a rape trial in 
two possible ways.  First, the complainant and the defendant could 
disagree about the fact or level of intoxication – i.e., capacity, so that the 
defendant claims either that the complainant was not drunk at all, or that 
she was not drunk to the degree that she was incapable of consenting but 
merely was disinhibited, and therefore she was in fact capable of, and 
 2. HOWARD PARKER ET AL., ILLEGAL LEISURE: THE NORMALIZATION OF ADOLESCENT 
DRUG USE 50 (Routledge 1998) (Eng.). 
 3. Specifically, I do not deal with problems of rape in non-heterosexual settings, though I 
recognize that many similar (and dissimilar) issues as to credibility and stereotypical expectations of 
socio-sexual behavior will arise.  I also recognize that this paper focuses somewhat narrowly on the 
ways in which intoxication and gender interact to disadvantage women in the court room, without 
an analysis of these issues within the context of, and intersection with, other axes of marginalization 
such as race, class, sexual orientation, and mental ill-health.  Finally, I do not discuss the issue of 
the defendant’s intoxication as this is a mens rea issue and this paper deals only with actus reus 
aspects of consent, in so far as they can be separated. 
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did, consent.  Second, there could be disagreement about whether or not 
there was consent – i.e., the defendant claims that the complainant gave 
consent, albeit drunken, and that she was capable even though 
intoxicated, whereas the complainant states that she cannot remember 
what happened because she was extremely drunk but that she knows that 
she did not want to have sex with the defendant (and she may also claim 
that she was too drunk to resist).  The claim then could be either that she 
was not intoxicated (enough) and capable, or, that despite a high level of 
intoxication, she did consent. 
Sometimes, as in the case of R. v. Bree,4 discussed below, these 
arguments converge.  However, regardless of how the defense argument 
is presented, this paper argues that there should be both greater 
legislative clarity on the issue of capacity, and more detailed guidance 
available to both judges and juries on how to treat the issue of 
intoxication in rape cases.  As it stands, the criminal law does not 
provide adequate protection to women who are raped.  In particular, this 
paper proposes that there ought to be a level of intoxication beyond 
which the complainant’s capacity is in serious doubt, and, consequently, 
the defendant’s claim of consent (or belief in consent) is called into 
question. 
Many feminists have recognized that law reform by itself will never 
solve the problem of rape.  Social change regarding gendered 
expectations of appropriate sexual activity and beliefs about 
responsibility for sexual assault is also crucial.  Therefore, in relation to 
sexual intimacy and intoxication, we need to know more, empirically, 
about women’s – and men’s – socio-sexual behavior, and we must also 
engage with the difficult educative process of shifting prejudices.  
Whilst acknowledging that, I will nonetheless argue that legal reform is 
necessary in order to have legislative clarity on central concepts such as 
capacity as well as more substantive guidance for judges and juries on 
the issue of (in)capacity, so that women who are extremely intoxicated 
are better protected from predatory (and/or extremely drunk) men who 
either cause or take advantage of their lack of capacity to consent to 
sexual intimacy. 
II.  CONSENT AND INTOXICATION 
The starting concern in an analysis of this nature is often to attempt 
to clearly define what is meant by consent.  This is an issue that I have 
 4. R. v. Bree, [2007] EWCA Crim 804, [2007] 2 Crim. App. R. 13 (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(U.K.). 
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examined in some detail in earlier work.5 Debates as to the nature of 
consent focus on determining whether consent is a state of mind, or 
whether consent is constituted by a set of actions or behaviors, 
performed in certain way.  This question has animated many legal and 
other philosophers and has been of particular importance in the rape 
context, because the issue of consent has proved to be the main focal 
point of most rape trials. 
The polarized positions taken in this definitional debate are 
represented briefly here in summaries of the work of philosophers Heidi 
Hurd and Nathan Brett, who have both written on this subject in the 
context of rape.6  In her paper “The Moral Magic of Consent,” Hurd 
perceives consent as attitudinal.7  She argues that “a person does all that 
she needs to do in order to alter the moral rights or obligations of 
another simply by entertaining the mens rea of consent”8 – that is, 
consent is an attitude, formed in the mind of the consenter.9  Only if the 
consenter intends to consent to (allow, enable) another’s actions will that 
amount to valid consent.10  Hurd rejects the suggestion that consent is a 
combination of intention and an action, since an action can only ever be 
evidence of mental state, and therefore cannot replace intention as being 
of primary moral relevance.11 
Nathan Brett, on the other hand, perceives consent to be a 
performative action.12  For him, the parties change their rights and 
obligations by giving permission, which is achieved by speaking or 
doing consent.13  He highlights the fact that consent in a medical law 
context could not properly be said to be purely a state of mind.14  
Consent is “not an attitude at all.  It is to act in a way that has 
conventional significance in communicating permission.”15  Consent as 
constituted by a mental state does not work in the context of sex because 
we are often ambivalent in our attitudes about sex, he argues.16  
 5. Cowan, supra note 1. 
 6. See Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121 (1996) (Eng.); 
Nathan Brett, Sexual Offenses and Consent, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 69, 69-88 (1998). 
 7. See Hurd, supra note 6. 
 8. Id. at 122. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 125, 130. 
 11. See id. 
 12. Brett, supra note 6. 
 13. Id. at 69. 
 14. Id. at 70. 
 15. Id. at 73. 
 16. Id. 
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Therefore, the matter turns on what we do or say to give the other party 
permission to act.17 
This overview of the complex and polarized debate on what 
constitutes consent, as exemplified in the work of Hurd and Brett, gives 
a flavor of the often conflicted nature of the conversation.  However, 
both positions pose problems for feminists who wish to reform the law 
of rape.  To say that consent is only a mental attitude does not address 
the question of ambivalent mental states, and further, how parties are to 
discern consent.  But to maintain that consent is purely performative 
could minimize the contextual importance of substantive conditions that 
drive consent, and could therefore be over-inclusive.  Both positions are 
evident in the history of rape law; the lengthy and ongoing debate over 
what counts as consent in rape laws takes place against this backdrop of 
whether mind or body can properly be said to be the locus of consent.  
Law reform in many countries has led to the replacement of rape laws 
that focus upon bodily force and resistance with laws that look more to 
the negation of will and violation of the victim’s autonomy.  
Nonetheless, in a rape trial, evidence as to consent, and its lack, is most 
often presented through a close analysis of the bodily responses and 
behaviors of the raped woman.18 
In addition, rape law often concentrates on one or the other, body or 
mind, or treats one as if it were independent of the other.  I have 
previously argued that rape law should try to avoid the dichotomy of 
mind/body, and instead should encapsulate elements of both body and 
mind.  That is, we can only properly see the harm of rape if we 
understand that there is a relationship between mind and body; but also 
we cannot conceptualize consent without proper attention to both body 
and mind – i.e., where sexual intimacy is to take place, particularly 
between those who are not already intimate, there must be both a 
positive state of mind and an expressive action before consent is present.  
There are many who would contest this view, and I have defended it 
elsewhere.19  In this context I wish to address the challenge that arises 
when defining consent where the victim of an alleged rape is intoxicated.  
Whether one believes consent truly to be a state of mind or an action, 
intoxication further complicates the issue.  If consent is a state of mind, 
being in an intoxicated state can make it extremely difficult to come to a 
settled state of mind since intoxicants clearly affect one’s rational 
 17. Id. at 80. 
 18. See Cowan, supra note 1 for a more in-depth discussion of these matters. 
 19. Id. 
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capacities (and of course it can also be very difficult for others to read 
one’s state of mind).  If, on the other hand, consent is an action, 
intoxicants can impair the physical and verbal abilities to the extent that 
action is either impossible or, again, difficult to read.  Either way 
intoxication can render consent obscure.  To argue that a proper 
understanding of consent requires attention to both body and mind does 
not necessarily help us here, where both body and mind are affected by 
intoxication.  How then to deal with the issue of a complainant’s 
intoxicated consent? 
This paper attends to the particular problem of understanding 
consent in the context of intoxication, arguing that the law on capacity to 
consent in intoxication cases is unclear and does not provide proper 
protection to women from rape and sexual assault.  Following on from 
the discussion about how consent is constituted, one might now also 
expect a definition of the other central concept of this paper – 
intoxication.  However, the idea that intoxication can be neatly classified 
is one of the main problems analyzed herein.  As stated above, 
intoxicants clearly affect the mind and also, by extension, the body.  But 
the threshold between ‘sobriety’ and ‘intoxication’ varies from person to 
person, and cannot be stated with any general certainty.  At this point in 
the paper it is sufficient to say that to be in a state of intoxication means 
that one’s mental and physical capacities are substantially altered from 
one’s ‘sober’ state, through the ingestion of intoxicating substances.  The 
question of what bearing this has on one’s ability to be a rational, 
choosing, autonomous subject will be discussed in some detail.  As a 
preliminary issue, we will turn to the backdrop of intoxicated consent by 
examining the place of intoxication in sexual assaults generally, 
alongside an increasing public awareness of this problem. 
III.  ALCOHOL AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 
Research has shown that the level of alcohol use in sexual assault 
cases is alarmingly high.  Andrea Finney’s 2004 summary of various 
research studies in this area shows that around 60% of perpetrators have 
been drinking just prior to the offense of sexual assault.20  However, 
statistics on the proportion of victims who have been drinking prior to 
the offense vary widely and depend partially on the sample – for 
instance, in student populations, up to 81% of incidents can involve 
 20. ANDREA FINNEY, HOME OFFICE, FINDINGS 215: ALCOHOL AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE: KEY 
FINDINGS FROM THE RESEARCH 2 (2004) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs04/r215.pdf. 
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drinking on the part of the victim.21  There has been no substantive 
research on intoxication of victims in the U.K. to date and the data 
referred to by Finney is generated in the U.S.22  However, more recent 
research in the U.K. (aimed at analyzing the attrition rate in rape cases 
rather than the rate of alcohol consumption per se) found that in a 
sample of 676 cases over eight police force areas, 38% of victims aged 
16 and above had been drinking, though not necessarily to the point of 
intoxication, prior to the assault.23 
Against that general backdrop, intoxicated consent to sex is an issue 
that has been given serious consideration in the U.K. recently.  Two 
particular incidents are worth noting as critical moments leading to, 
amongst other things, a 2006 government report in the form of a Home 
Office consultation document.24  The first critical moment was a trial in 
Swansea Crown court in 2005, R. v. Dougal, where the judge directed 
the jury to acquit the defendant in the middle of the trial.25  The 
prosecution stated that they could not proceed because the complainant 
could not remember, because of intoxication through alcohol 
consumption, whether or not she had agreed to have sex with the 
defendant, who was a security guard at her University residence.26  
While she asserted that there was no way she would have agreed to have 
sex with the man, who was a complete stranger to her, she could not 
remember whether she had actually consented or not, and the jury was 
instructed to find the defendant not guilty, the judge remarking that 
 21. Id. at 2. 
 22. Id.  This data also suggests that alcohol related sexual assaults are more likely to occur 
between people who do not know each other, in contradistinction to the long established 
sociological finding that, in general, most sexual assaults occur between people who know each 
other.  However, we must be aware of the problem of under reporting.  Survey data, such as that of 
the British Crime Survey, demonstrates that rapes involving intimates or acquaintances are less 
likely to be reported than rape involving strangers.  See ANDY MYHILL & JONATHAN ALLEN, HOME 
OFFICE, FINDINGS 159: RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT OF WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE BRITISH 
CRIME SURVEY 5 (2002) (U.K.), available at http://www.rapecrisis.org.uk/HOFindings159.pdf.  It is 
not clear how many of these non-reported incidents involve alcohol use. 
 23. ANDY FEIST ET AL., HOME OFFICE, INVESTIGATING AND DETECTING RECORDED 
OFFENCES OF RAPE 18 (2007) (U.K.), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/rdsolr1807.pdf.  As 
the study was not specifically designed to measure alcohol intake in victims of rape, these figures 
are most likely an underestimate.  On alcohol and sexual assault see also Miranda A. H. Horvath & 
Jennifer Brown, The Role of Alcohol and Drugs in Rape, 46 MED. SCI. AND LAW 219, 223 (2006). 
 24. See  OFFICE FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM, CONVICTING RAPISTS AND PROTECTING 
VICTIMS – JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF RAPE (2006) (Eng.), available at 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-290306-justice-rape-victims?view=Binary. 
 25. Id. at 7.  This case was not reported as the trial was discontinued. 
 26. Clare Dyer, Calls for Inquiry After Rape Case Collapses over “Drunken Consent”, THE 
GUARDIAN, Nov. 24, 2005, at 4. 
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“drunken consent is still consent.”27  The case received large-scale 
critical media attention, was perceived to demonstrate the intractable 
problems of discerning consent to sexual intimacy when intoxication is 
involved, and was specifically identified as problematic both by the 
government consultation paper mentioned above, and by the Court of 
Appeal in the more recent and pivotal case of R. v. Bree, discussed 
below.28 
The second moment was the widespread media reporting and 
critique of the findings of a survey on public perceptions of rape victims, 
carried out in 2005 in England and Wales by Amnesty International.29  
The report suggested that almost a third (30%) of respondents believed 
that a woman who had been drinking and who was subsequently raped 
was at least partially responsible for the attack.30  A Scottish study on 
attitudes towards rape and domestic violence recently reported broadly 
similar findings.31  Alongside a more general governmental concern 
with binge drinking, and the problem of underage and teenage alcohol 
consumption,32 the media attention given to these two moments 
highlight an increasing public awareness in the U.K. of the issue of the 
impact of intoxication on capacity to consent to sexual intimacy. 
These incidents culminated in the U.K. Home Office consultation 
document, referred to above, on the operation of sexual offenses 
legislation in England and Wales.  In this document, the government 
acknowledged that victim intoxication is a key concern, particularly in a 
climate of extremely low conviction rates for rape.33  The legislation 
 27. R. v. Bree, [2007] EWCA Crim 804, [2007] 2 Crim. App. R. 13 (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(U.K.).   The Court of Appeal in Bree, discussed below, admitted that this phrase “lacked delicacy.”  
Id.  Andrew Ashworth has recommended that the expression should not be used by judges in rape 
cases.  Andrew Ashworth, Comment, Rape: Consent – Intoxication, CRIM L. R. 2007, Nov., 900, 
903.  Because the R. v. Dougal trial was abandoned, there is no official report of the case.  But see 
Dyer, supra note 26. 
 28. Bree, [2007] EWCA Crim 804, [2007] 2 Crim. App. R. 13 (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(U.K.). 
 29. See ICM, SEXUAL ASSAULT RESEARCH SUMMARY REPORT 5 (2005) (prepared for 
Amnesty International U.K.). 
 30. Id. at 5. 
 31. 27% of people thought a woman was responsible for the attack if she was drunk. OFFICE 
OF CHIEF RESEARCHER, DOMESTIC ABUSE 2006/07: POST-CAMPAIGN EVALUATION 15, 2007 
(Scot.), http://www.scotland.gov.uk/socialresearch. 
 32. The current U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown has recently announced an intention to 
crack down on binge drinking and on the sale of very cheap alcoholic drinks in pubs, particularly as 
this impacts young drinkers; see Brown Backs Alcohol Sales Crackdown, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, 
Nov. 21, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uklatest/story/0,,-7093916,00.html. 
 33. See LIZ KELLY ET AL., HOME OFFICE RESEARCH STUDY 293: A GAP OR A CHASM? 
ATTRITION IN REPORTED RAPE CASES 63 (2005) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/hors293.pdf.  See also HER MAJESTY’S CROWN 
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under scrutiny, the Sexual Offences Act 2003, defines consent in section 
74 as agreement by choice, where the person has the “freedom and 
capacity to make that choice.”34  The consultation document recognized 
that this use of the term ‘capacity’ raised some difficulties as regards the 
validity of drunken consent. Section 75 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 
specifically sets out a list of situations where non-consent will be 
presumed (though the presumption is rebuttable).35  One of these non-
consent presumptions will arise where a substance which has the 
potential to cause or enable the victim to be stupefied or overpowered 
has been given to an individual prior to sexual activity (section 75(2)(f)); 
however, there is no mention of any mental state short of ‘stupefaction,’ 
or of voluntary as opposed to involuntary intoxication.36  This raises the 
key issue of how to deal with the situation where a woman has been 
voluntarily drinking and is intoxicated short of the point of 
unconsciousness, but where her “capacity” to choose has been 
undermined or eliminated through intoxication. 
IV.  DEFINING CAPACITY TO CHOOSE 
The central questions about intoxicated consent posed by the 
consultation document were whether or not there should be a statutory 
definition of capacity; and whether the Sexual Offences Act 2003 ought 
to be amended to introduce a rebuttable presumption that consent was 
absent if it was given by the complainant while she was a state of 
extreme drunkenness.  The U.K. tabloid media responded somewhat 
hysterically to this suggestion by speculating that the government would 
try to set a ‘drink and sex limit,’ similar to the drink-driving limit.37  
This would involve the police carrying out blood and urine tests, and 
then scientists using ‘back calculations’ to work out how drunk the 
woman had been.38  Notwithstanding the concerns of varying individual 
responses to alcohol consumption, the practice is often relied upon, 
PROSECUTION SERVICE INSPECTORATE & HER MAJESTY’S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY, 
WITHOUT CONSENT: A REPORT ON THE JOINT REVIEW OF THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION 
OF RAPE OFFENCES (2007) (U.K.) available at 
http://www.hmcpsi.gov.uk/reports/Without_Consent_Thematic.pdf. 
 34. Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, § 74 (U.K.). 
 35. Id. § 75. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Men Face Jail for Rape if Women are ‘Too Drunk’ to Consent in Bed to Boost 
Convictions, THIS IS LONDON, Dec. 28, 2008, http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-
23379673details/Men+face+jail+for+rape+if+women+are+%27too+drunk%27+to+consent+in+bed
+to+boost+convictions/article.do. 
 38. Id. 
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allowing for a certain margin of error, in the context of proving a charge 
of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.  However, the House 
of Lords in Gumbley v. Cunningham has suggested that the practice 
should not be routinely relied upon, and can only be used where it is 
irrefutable (allowing for the maximum level of error), that the driver 
would have been over the legal alcohol limit at the time of the alleged 
offense.39  In such cases the test results will provide the central plank of 
the prosecution’s evidence, and the offense is one of strict liability. 
However the test results would be used in a probatively different 
sense in a rape trial and the anxiety expressed about the use of such tests 
in the rape context is probably misplaced.  The Crown Prosecution 
Service in England and Wales in their guidance to prosecutors of rape 
cases have explicitly stated that prosecutors should consider the use of 
experts to ‘back calculate’ how intoxicated a woman was at the time of 
the alleged attack.40  Although Andrew Ashworth argues that this will 
not always be a helpful test, since a woman can still agree to have sex in 
advanced stages of intoxication,41 and, as already mentioned, the test is 
not scientifically precisely accurate, in rape cases the test result would 
not be the main piece of evidence upon which the prosecution would 
rely in order to prove the charge of rape.  Indeed, since rape is not a 
strict liability offense, the calculation could never be used to establish a 
defendant’s guilt, which will always rest upon the prosecution having 
demonstrated the relevant mens rea.  But the test results could 
conceivably form one piece of evidence to be taken into account as to 
the likely level of the complainant’s intoxication. 
Similarly resistant to reform, the President of the Queen’s Bench 
division of the Court of Appeal in England and Wales, Sir Igor Judge, 
has recently commented, in the case of R. v. Bree, on the question of the 
need for a statutory framework in rape cases to help courts decide 
whether too much alcohol had been consumed for consent to be valid.42  
Sir Judge stated in Bree that it is the role of the court to decide whether 
or not the woman’s capacity has been diminished to the degree that 
consent is not possible, and that this is not an issue that can be 
 39. Gumbley v. Cunningham, [1989] A.C. 281 (Eng.). For discussion, see J. K. Mason, Back-
calculation and the Crown Agents’ Letters (2000) 5 SCOT. L. & P.Q. 25; and SHARON COWAN & A. 
C. HUNT, MASON’S FORENSIC MEDICINE FOR LAWYERS (Tottel 5th ed. 2008) (U.K.). 
 40. THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE: SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 2003, 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/section7/chapter_a.html (last visited March 10, 2008). 
 41. Ashworth, supra note 27, at 901. 
 42. [2007] EWCA Crim 804, [2007] 2 Crim. App. R. 13 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).  
The case is discussed in detail below. 
COWAN_FINAL 3/23/2009  3:09 PM 
2008] THE TROUBLE WITH DRINK 909 
 
appropriately decided by a statutory tariff system.43  Given that those in 
favor of a capacity test tend to do so from the perspective of preventing 
women from being ‘taken advantage of’ and thereby protecting their 
sexual and bodily autonomy, Sir Judge somewhat ironically suggested 
that such a statutory test could interfere with the autonomy of drunken 
women to choose to have sex. 
It would be problematic to have a blanket rule that the consumption 
of a certain number of units of alcohol by itself renders consensual sex 
impossible.  In some of these kinds of cases the woman will desire, and 
expressly consent to, sex.  Further, the presence and validity of consent 
is also related to the question of the relationship between the parties – 
the issues may be very different in relation to a couple who have been 
intimate over a long period of time, as opposed to two people who have 
just met or barely know each other.44  In that sense any rigid rule that a 
certain level of intoxication would cancel out consent, contravenes 
principles of autonomy.  But there may still be room to argue that, 
absent a prior agreement that sex should take place when very drunk or 
unconscious, a state of extreme drunkenness can impede the capacity to 
consent to sexual intimacy, particularly in the kinds of cases discussed 
below, where the parties barely know each other.  This raises two 
distinct concerns: first, how do we retain skepticism about extremely 
intoxicated consent while avoiding a paternalistic and rigid rule negating 
the possibility of drunken consent; and second how do we define 
extreme intoxication, i.e. incapacity? 
In answer to the first concern, one possible avenue would be to 
include extreme drunkenness within the 2003 Act’s list of rebuttable 
presumptions of lack of consent.  Rather than a blanket rule that consent 
can never exist in such circumstances, extreme drunkenness could give 
rise to a presumption of a lack of consent, a presumption which will 
stand unless the defendant can show either that the complainant was not 
extremely drunk and there had been express consent to drunken sex prior 
to the act of extremely intoxicated intimacy, or, that he had a reasonable 
belief that this was the case (which is obviously a mens rea issue).  This 
rebuttable presumption model is the sort of route taken in the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 in England and Wales, though extreme drunkenness 
is not one of the situations listed in the act that would give rise to an 
evidential presumption of non-consent.45 
 43. See id. 
 44. See Cowan, supra note 1, for discussion of this issue.  Thanks also to Victor Tadros for 
reminding me of this point. 
 45. Evidence raised to rebut the presumption, which could either be evidence of consent or 
COWAN_FINAL 3/23/2009  3:09 PM 
910 AKRON LAW REVIEW [41:899 
out. 
 
Another possible route, somewhat similar, is that recently proposed 
by the Scottish Law Commission (SLC) in their 2007 Report on Rape 
and Other Sexual Offences.46  Following a review of the law and a 
consultation exercise, the SLC has recommended to the Scottish 
government that there should be a list, similar to that which appears in 
section 75 of the 2003 Sexual Offences Act discussed above, of 
‘particular definitions’ or factual situations of non-consent.47  Unlike the 
2003 Act, which states that where, for example, consent is obtained by 
force, this force is evidence of a lack of consent, the SLC prefers the 
approach that such circumstances are constitutive of a lack of consent.48  
The SLC set out a non-exhaustive list of non-consensual situations 
which includes the factual situation where a person “had taken or been 
given alcohol or other substances and as a result lacked capacity to 
consent at the time of expressing or indicating consent unless consent 
had been given to engaging in the activity in that condition.”49  The 
court is therefore put on notice that when capacity through intoxication 
is in doubt, it is irrelevant how that intoxication came ab
While it is possible that neither of these routes would provide a 
complete solution to the problem of defining consent or lack of consent, 
it is at least evident that a statutory response to the question, ‘How do we 
retain suspicion about capacity where intoxicated consent is given and 
simultaneously avoid overly restricting autonomy?’ is possible.  The 
legal profession’s response to the U.K. government 2006 consultation on 
rape was predominantly in favor of leaving the law as it currently stands, 
on the basis that it would be an over-reaction to change the law because 
of one exceptional case – R. v. Dougal – which did not fundamentally 
demonstrate the inadequacy of the law.50 
evidence as to a belief in consent that is reasonable in all the circumstances, must then be disproved 
by the prosecution in order for a rape conviction to result.  See Sexual Offenses Act 2003 section 
75.  Criticism of this formulation and approach to the problem has been raised by scholars such as: 
Sharon Cowan et al., Open Letter to the Scottish Law Commission’s Consultant Document, 25 S. L. 
T. 157, 159 (2006); Victor Tadros, Rape Without Consent, 26 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 515, 528 
(2006); DAVID ORMEROD, SMITH AND HOGAN CRIMINAL LAW 602-11 (Oxford 11th ed. 2005); 
Jennifer Temkin & Andrew Ashworth, Rape, Sexual Assaults and the Problems of Consent, CRIM. 
L.REV. 2004, MAY 328, 336 (2004). 
 46. SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT ON RAPE AND OTHER SEXUAL OFFENCES (2007) 
(U.K.). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.  The list is also dissimilar to that set out in the 2003 Act in that the SLC have, 
laudably, proposed a non-exhaustive list of possible non-consensual situations where the 2003 Act 
legislates for an exhaustive list. 
 49. Id. at 29. 
 50. OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM, CONVICTING RAPISTS AND PROTECTING VICTIMS 
– JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF RAPE: RESPONSE TO CONSULTATION 7 (2007) (U.K.).  This is doubly 
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Rumney and Fenton point out that it is not uncommon for judges to 
be critical of government proposals for rape law reform.51  But, they 
rightly argue, leaving extreme drunkenness out of the section 75 
rebuttable presumptions list implies a hierarchy of intoxicated victims; 
individuals who are involuntarily intoxicated are given specific legal 
protection by including them in the list, whilst those who are voluntarily 
intoxicated are left to fit themselves within the general terms of section 
74 of the 2003 Act.  Excluding voluntary intoxication in this way is 
likely to be problematic, as discussed below.  In any case it appears, 
unfortunately, that the U.K. government has now decided that legislative 
clarification or reform of the status of voluntarily intoxicated and 
incapacitated victims is unnecessary.52 
As to the second issue, the problem of how to discern whether a 
woman is so drunk as to be incapable of consent due to alcohol 
consumption remains.  The question of whether an individual woman is 
intoxicated to the point of being incapable of consent is a matter of the 
facts and circumstances of each case.  Each person will reach the stage 
of ‘extreme drunkenness’ at a different point – someone who has never 
had alcohol will become extremely drunk well before someone who is a 
habitual heavy drinker.  The individual nature of this threshold cannot be 
captured in a legislative test.  Leaving aside the possibility of a more 
abstract statutory definition of the principles of capacity,53 there is 
strong evidence that putting the issue of (in)capacity solely in the hands 
of the jury is problematic.  It is evident from research carried out in the 
U.K. by Vanessa Munro and Emily Finch, that when left to the jury, 
questions of capacity to consent to sexual intercourse are subject to 
ongoing prejudicial beliefs about appropriate gendered behavior, and 
ultimately, the underlying tenacious notion that a woman assumes the 
unfortunate since the reason given by the Home Office for not introducing reform is that the court in 
a recent case, R. v. Bree, has given some judicial guidance on the concept of capacity.  Id. at 10-11.  
However, this case, as I discuss below, does not provide adequate guidance on incapacity to consent 
to sexual intimacy. 
 51. Philip N.S. Rumney & Rachel Anne Fenton, Intoxicated Consent in Rape: Bree and Juror 
Decision-Making, 71 MOD. L. R. 279 (2008).  The consultation document itself, they highlight, 
makes unsubstantiated speculative reference to the possibility that statutory reforms which would 
include extreme drunkenness as a rebuttable presumption situation could lead to mischievous 
accusations.  Id. 
 52. Joshua Rozenberg, Law on Consent in Rape Cases is Clear Enough, DAILY TELEGRAPH, 
June 19, 2007, at 2.  See footnote 50, above.   
 53. See, for example, the definition given in PETER ROOK & ROBERT WARD, ROOK AND 
WARD ON SEXUAL OFFENCES LAW AND PRACTICE 90 (3rd ed. 2004) or Sexual Offences Act, 2003, 
c. 42, § 30(2) (U.K.), referring to mental incapacity, or the simpler test referred to by Ashworth – 
awareness, understanding and ability.  See generally Ashworth, supra note 27. 
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risk of any harm of sexual assault, and thus bears responsibility for any 
attack perpetrated upon her, particularly where she has been drink 54
While many jurors in the Finch and Munro study of mock rape 
trials recognized that the perpetrator bore some responsibility for the 
sexual assault, a significant number of them treated the issue of 
responsibility as what David Archard has called a “zero-sum picture;”55 
that is, if the woman was perceived to bear some responsibility for the 
rape – for example if the jury blamed her for not being fully in control of 
her glass which the perpetrator later spiked with alcohol – this 
sufficiently diminished the perpetrator’s responsibility, leading to his 
acquittal in the rape charge.56  In addition, the 2005 Amnesty 
International Poll referred to above demonstrated that many of the 
people surveyed (ordinary, though one might say, not necessarily 
reasonable, people), still believe that a woman who has been drinking is 
in some way to blame if she is sexually assaulted.57  Leaving the issue of 
capacity to the jury, then, is not necessarily the answer to the problem of 
intoxicated consent. 
Alongside questions of jury prejudice, there is the question of what 
direction the trial judge should give to the jury.  In England and Wales, 
out with the general terms of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, there is no 
form of judicial guidance on the meaning of any of its terms, much less 
the terms of the all important section 74, such as capacity, freedom, and 
so on.  Thus, the judge has no guidelines on how to assist the jury in 
deciding, for example, what bearing the victim’s intoxication has upon 
her capacity to consent.  The question seems to be, simply, did the 
victim have capacity to consent or not?  The more difficult question as to 
what that actually means in practice is left unresolved.  In the next 
section I will analyze two recent cases in order to demonstrate the 
challenges courts face in dealing with intoxicated consent, and the 
unsatisfactory and discriminatory way in which the U.K. judiciary treats 
capacity to consent (and more importantly incapacity as to consent). 
 54. Emily Finch & Vanessa Munro, Juror Stereotypes and Blame Attribution in Rape Cases 
Involving Intoxicants: The Findings of a Pilot Study, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 25, 30 (2005) 
[hereinafter, Finch & Munro, Juror Stereotypes]; see Emily Finch & Vanessa Munro, Breaking 
Boundaries?: Sexual Consent in the Jury Room, 26 LEGAL STUD. 303, 318 (2006) [hereinafter, 
Finch & Munro, Breaking Boundaries]; Emily Finch & Vanessa Munro, The Demon Drink and the 
Demonized Woman: Socio-Sexual Stereotypes and Responsibility Attribution in Rape Trials 
Involving Intoxicants, 16 SOC. AND LEGAL STUD. 591 (2007) [hereinafter Finch & Munro, Demon 
Drink]. 
 55. DAVID ARCHARD, SEXUAL CONSENT 139 (Westview 1998). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Finch & Munro, Demon Drink, supra note 54, at 593 (citing the 2005 Amnesty 
International poll). 
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V.  THE ‘EVAPORATION’ OF CAPACITY TO CONSENT: SIDESTEPPING THE 
ISSUE? 
So where exactly does the dividing line between capacity and 
incapacity, when intoxication is involved, fall?  The most recent English 
case in the area, R. v. Bree,58 has thrown this question into sharp relief.  
A brief discussion of the facts is necessary to demonstrate the court’s 
approach to intoxication and capacity to consent. 
Two young women went out for the evening with two young men 
and all four became drunk.59  One of the couples returned to the 
complainant’s flat, where the woman became sick.  The defendant found 
her on her bathroom floor and said that he ‘looked after her’ – washed 
her hair, found pajamas for her, and left the room while she changed.  At 
this point the accounts of the complainant and defendant diverged.  The 
complainant maintained that she awoke to find the defendant having sex 
with her, that she did not want to have sex, and that she was saying no in 
her head but that alcohol had diminished her ability to physically resist.  
However, her memory of events was patchy and she could not remember 
what was said or done throughout the entire event.  The defendant 
maintained that she was a conscious, willing, and active participant and 
had removed her own pajamas.  He argued that while she had been 
drinking, and was influenced by alcohol, she was “not drunk and 
incapable.”60  The defendant was convicted, but his conviction was 
quashed on appeal because the Court of Appeal found that the jury 
lacked proper direction from the trial judge regarding the impact of 
intoxication upon the complainant’s capacity to consent.61 
One of the problems for the prosecution in Bree was that initially 
their case had rested on the fact that the victim was unconscious during 
the event.62  If this account had been credible to the jury, incapacity 
would have been established.  However, it became clear during the trial 
process that this was in fact not so, and that the complainant had been 
conscious for at least some of the duration of the sexual intercourse.63  
 58. R. v. Bree, [2007] EWCA Crim 804, [2007] 2 Crim. App. R. 13 (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(U.K.). 
 59. Id. at 160-61. 
 60. Id. at 162. 
 61. Id.  The court criticized the judge in R. v. Dougal for stating that there was no case to 
answer because the complainant could not remember what had happened.  Id. at 166.  In this 
respect, Bree was followed in the case of R. v. H, [2007] EWCA Crim 2056, 32 (appeal taken from 
Eng.).  The court here again stated that matters of capacity should be left to the jury.  Id. 
 62. Bree, [2007] EWCA Crim 804, [2007] 2 Crim. App. R. 13 (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(U.K.). 
 63. Id. 
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At closing arguments, the Crown’s case was that she had been conscious 
and had the capacity to consent, but that she had not consented, and had 
not resisted because of the effects of alcohol.64 
Here, as in R. v. Dougal, the trial judge stated that “drunken consent 
is still consent,” but the key question as he saw it, was whether sex had 
occurred without consent.65  While the prosecution seemed to accept that 
the complainant did have capacity because she had been conscious for 
some of the period of intimacy, the conviction was overturned on appeal 
at least in part because the judge did not give specific enough guidance 
on what the impact of the intoxication would have been on the victim’s 
capacity to consent, and the differential impact upon capacity to consent 
of being unconscious as opposed to being conscious but very drunk.66  
The fact that the judge had not addressed the question of whether the 
victim would have behaved in the same way had she been sober was a 
specific omission identified by the Court of Appeal.67 
This may well be the kind of case (if not this case in particular) 
which raises genuinely difficult issues, especially problems of proof, 
where both people involved are very drunk and the accounts differ as to 
the detail of what happened and when it happened.  But the question of 
whether or not an individual would have behaved similarly had she been 
sober is arguably irrelevant to the question of whether or not she had the 
capacity to consent, and indeed, whether or not she did consent in this 
instance.  The complexities of establishing consent or its lack do not 
absolve the judge of his duty to properly guide the jury on the issue of 
capacity.  But how do we know when a woman is too drunk to consent?  
How do we know whether or not she has consented to sex if she herself 
does not know, because she cannot remember the events?  R. v. Bree, 
alongside R. v. Dougal and other cases such as R. v. Gardner, discussed 
below, seems to suggest that if she cannot remember a refusal, or indeed 
if she cannot remember anything at all, providing she was conscious, 
then she will be presumed to have consented, or at least, the man’s belief 
in her consent will stand, and it is not rape. 
While on the one hand it is clearly unfair to convict someone of an 
offense they have not committed, on the other, it is similarly egregious 
to leave uncontested the notion that someone who is drunk enough to 
have memory blackouts and be vomiting, with periods of 
unconsciousness (like the complainant in R. v. Bree) can be presumed to 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 167. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 169. 
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have the capacity to consent.  In other words, here consciousness seems 
to stand in for capacity, regardless of the fact that the complainant 
herself says she did not want to have sex and that she felt unable to 
physically resist when she was conscious.  Here, the law reads from the 
event enough capacity to consent to sexual activity, despite the 
complainant’s extremely inebriated state.  The crucial questions here 
then are how much drunkenness is too much, i.e., how much impedes 
and negates one’s ability to consent; in other words, what do we mean 
by capacity in this context, and how does this impact on consent? 
Rightly, the Court of Appeal was critical of the lack of guidance 
given by the judge to the jury as to the role of intoxication in the case.  
However, the Court of Appeal’s judgment was itself lacking in proper 
guidance on this issue.  The court in Bree accepts that there is a point 
before unconsciousness where the capacity to consent can “evaporate,”68 
but again there is no proffered assistance on where this point might be.  
One might be tempted to think that if a person is drunk to the point of 
having been sick and been put to bed, and is having memory blackouts, 
that this might be such a point, but this does not seem to be the 
conclusion drawn in R. v. Bree.  While the court stresses that the 
question of capacity is an individual contextually specific one, there is 
no suggestion that this is the kind of case, these are the kinds of facts, 
that might invite us to be skeptical about capacity.  Instead the 
complainant’s inability to remember, to know whether or not she 
consented (out with the confines of her own head), becomes the space 
where the defendants belief in consent occupies and takes root.  
Similarly, while in the R. v. Dougal case, the complainant asserts that 
she would not have had sex with the defendant who was unknown to her, 
because she cannot remember having actually said no, doubt remains 
either that she may have said yes, or at least her lack of refusal can be 
reasonably interpreted as a yes, and the defendant is acquitted.  This is 
despite the fact that in English law, at least, there is no obligation upon 
the complainant to have explicitly refused consent to intercourse, 
because submission is not equivalent to consent.69 
The court clearly states in R. v. Bree that the problem in 
intoxication cases does not lie with legal principles as stated in the 2003 
Act - section 74 on consent, freedom, and capacity is perfectly clear - 
but with the application of these principles to the infinite vagaries of 
 68. Id. at 167. 
 69. R. v. Olugboja, [1982] Q.B. 320, 330 (appeal taken from Eng.).  Arguably the position in 
Scots law is the same, in light of the reforms introduced by the case of Lord Advocate’s Reference 
No.1 of 2001 2002 SCCR 435. 
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human behavior and the difficulties of proof.70  These hurdles are indeed 
particularly daunting in intoxication cases.  However, the legal 
principles, encapsulated in the 2003 legislation, regarding capacity and 
freedom to choose, are not without difficulty, especially if judges are 
unwilling to flesh out these rather skeletal concepts by giving guidance 
as to the kinds of cases where capacity is sufficiently undermined.  At 
the very least, as the court in R. v. Bree stated, the judge should be 
directing the jury as to how to apply general principles of capacity – 
awareness, understanding, and ability – to the facts of the case before 
them.71  But, in the absence of (and perhaps impossibility of) any 
legislative guidance as to what counts as (in)capacity or extreme 
drunkenness, there should be some judicial guidance as to what kinds of 
factual situations could establish a lack of awareness, understanding, and 
ability. 
In the earlier case of R. v. Gardner,72 the court also confronted the 
problem of intoxicated consent, although here the complainant was a 
fourteen year old girl who had been digitally penetrated by a nineteen 
year old boy.  Gardener was a sentencing appeal as the defendant had 
pled guilty to sexual activity with a child under section 9 of the 2003 
Sexual Offences Act, to which consent is not a defense.73  Despite the 
fact that the defendant had been asked to look after the complainant as 
she was very drunk, he followed her into the bathroom and 
propositioned her while she vomited.  Although the complainant could 
not and did not answer, he digitally penetrated her.74  At the sentencing 
stage, the trial judge accepted that “what the defendant had done was 
consensual,” even if it was drunken consent and despite the fact that the 
young woman had been “taken advantage of.”75 
The cases of Bree and Gardner highlight both the dangers of case 
by case judicial interpretation of capacity to consent to sexual intimacy, 
and the need for more detailed guidance for both judges and juries on 
 70. [2007] EWCA Crim 804, 167-68, [2007] 2 Crim. App. R. 13 (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(U.K.). 
 71. Ashworth, supra note 27, at 902. 
 72. R. v. Gardner, [2005] EWCA Crim 1399 (appeal taken from Wales) (U.K.). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at ¶ 11.  The appellate court further accepted that the defendant had reasonably 
believed there to be consent, even though he knew she was drunk, and although, as they themselves 
said, the defendant knew she was only 14 and that “consent could not possibly justify what he was 
doing.”  Id. at ¶ 15.  The recommendation put forward by the Home Office in its 2006 consultation 
paper, that there should be a statutory definition of capacity, does not address the issue, highlighted 
in Gardner, of the troubling persistence of defendants’ claims to reasonable belief in consent despite 
incapacity. 
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intoxication and (in)capacity to consent.  In neither Gardener nor Bree, 
on the facts, does the complainant appear to have capacity to consent.  
However, even if it were found on the facts that there was room to doubt 
this conclusion, the courts could at least acknowledge that these are the 
kinds of circumstances where capacity is in doubt. 
That is not to say that either memory loss or vomiting always in 
themselves imply incapacity to consent.  But there are strong reasons to 
think that if someone is suffering from these kinds of problems, this 
would indicate extreme intoxication so that lack of capacity to consent 
would be indicated.  In other words, if following alcohol consumption 
the complainant has experienced one or more of a cluster of possible 
symptoms – vomiting, inability to speak or move, memory loss, or 
periods of unconsciousness for example76 – it may be assumed that she 
did not have capacity to consent, unless the defendant can show and the 
jury believes that she in fact was not extremely intoxicated and had in 
fact given consent.  Again, if a back calculation of intoxication level 
could be used to a high degree of certainty, this could be one piece of 
relevant probative evidence to take into account.  If it can be shown, for 
example, that it is highly likely that the complainant was extremely 
intoxicated at the time of the alleged offense, this could prima facie 
bring her within a possible “extreme drunkenness” statutory rebuttable 
presumption, discussed above, and could also raise questions about the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s claim to belief in consent. 
However, where the victim is drunk short of the point of 
unconsciousness, there is broad scope for the defendant and the victim to 
disagree about the degree of intoxication and incapacity, particularly 
where back calculation is either not available (because of delay in 
reporting) or insufficiently accurate, and where there are no other 
witness accounts.  One issue is the worry (expressed in the 2006 
government consultation document amongst other places) that since 
alcohol is also a disinhibitor, a woman who has sex when she is drunk 
(but not incapacitated) will regret the encounter the following morning 
and that she will ‘cry rape’ by retrospectively trying to revoke her 
consent through exaggerating the extent of her drunkenness.  Aside from 
the unfounded nature of this claim (and the exaggerated problem of false 
allegations),77 one resulting problem is that in the courtroom it translates 
 76. Of course, sexual intercourse with a woman who is unconscious and has not previously 
stated that she wants to have sexual intercourse in such a state (itself an unlikely scenario), is rape 
under both Scottish and English law in any case. 
 77. For discussion of this problem, see Philip N.S. Rumney, False Allegations of Rape, 65 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 128 (2006). See also KELLY ET AL., supra note 33. 
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into the defendant’s claim that the complainant was not drunk enough to 
be incapable but only drunk enough to be loosened up or disinhibited – 
i.e., that she gave drunken consent.  The defendant claims an appearance 
of lack of intoxication as part of a defense of consent or belief in 
consent.  Again here the void left by vague legal principle and an 
absence of judicial direction on capacity is filled by the defendant’s 
allegations of the actuality of consent despite drunkenness, the 
appearance of soberness, or the appearance of sufficient capacity to 
consent, so that whether or not the victim in fact has capacity to choose 
becomes a secondary matter.78 
Of course, there may be plenty of supporting evidence to suggest 
that the victim was indeed extremely drunk – if for example she was 
seen collapsing or vomiting, or had to be carried into a taxi.  In these 
kinds of cases the defendant’s assertion that he did not believe her to be 
drunk is less likely to be accepted by the court, but still it is a question of 
establishing the degree of intoxication, hence, the credibility of the 
witnesses is paramount.  As argued above, there are residual prejudices 
and biases inherent in the jury decision making regarding the 
responsibility and credibility of a woman who has been drinking.  And if 
indeed the defendant genuinely did not believe the complainant to be 
drunk beyond capacity point, and believed her to be consenting, the 
mens rea criteria for an offense of rape, in England and Wales at least, 
only require that this belief of valid consent be “reasonable in all the 
circumstances” (another vague and unhelpful phrase) rather than 
reasonable per se.79 
The phrase that seems to emerge in the claims of these defendants 
is that the victim was “drunk but not incapable,”80 begging the question, 
incapable of what?  It appears that as long as the victim is capable of 
walking, or talking, or even of being sick, this means that she is capable 
of having consented to sex.  The possibility is not considered that in 
light of our supposed commitment to the ideal of sexual autonomy, and 
 78. Of course, it is possible to reduce this point to the base line argument that lack of mens 
rea always trumps the existence of actus reus.  However, this paper focuses only on the issue of the 
lack of clarity on a key actus reus issue, that is, lack of consent.  For discussion of the significant 
problems associated with the mens rea of rape, see Sharon Cowan, Freedom and Capacity to Make 
a Choice: A Feminist Analysis of Consent in the Criminal Law of Rape, in SEXUALITY AND THE 
LAW: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS 51-71 (Vanessa Munro & Carl Stychin eds., 2007); Heather 
Douglas, Stories of Mistaken Consent: Still in the Shadow of Morgan, in CHOICE AND CONSENT: 
FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS WITH LAW AND SUBJECTIVITY 109 (Rosemary Hunter & Sharon Cowan 
eds., 2007). 
 79. Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, § 1(2) (U.K.). For a critique, see Cowan, supra note 78. 
 80. See, e.g., R. v. Bree, [2007] EWCA Crim 804, 162, [2007] 2 Crim. App. R. 13 (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
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criminal law’s central role in protecting that sexual autonomy, the 
capacity to consent to sexual intimacy might require a higher threshold 
of cognitive and rational ability than the level required to stumble home, 
unlock the door and promptly vomit in the shower. 
More worryingly, it seems that even intoxication leading to 
intermittent periods of unconsciousness will not in itself be thought to 
sufficiently undermine a woman’s capacity to consent to sex.81  This 
seems to be the case, notwithstanding the conclusion of the court in the 
English case of R. v. Kaitamaki,82 where the Court of Appeal held that 
consent has to be present throughout the duration of the intercourse if 
sex is to be consensual.83  In a Scottish case, Peace v. HMA,84 one of the 
appeal judges went so far as to say that even though the complainer85 
had been unconscious for some of the period during which sex had taken 
place (the accused was seen by witnesses having sex with the 
complainer while she was “out cold”), that we should remember that 
consciousness can be intermittent and that while the complainer had 
earlier collapsed and had been thought to have no pulse, this did not 
reflect on her ability while later conscious to consent to sex.86 
It was not claimed that the complainer had previously said that she 
would have sex whilst extremely intoxicated or unconscious, but rather 
that what appears to be extreme intoxication was found not to negate 
later consent, because of the presence of some consciousness.  Not only 
that, but the judge said, where there are periods of consciousness and 
unconsciousness following each other in quick succession, “it is just 
these situations in which misunderstandings may well arise.”87 
This kind of judicial statement does nothing to offer sound, 
reasoned guidance on incapacity and indeed arguably directly 
contradicts the notion that in cases such as these, the judge ought to 
 81. This result is in contrast to the pre-2003 Sexual Offences Act English case, R. v. Malone, 
[1998] 2 Crim. App. R. 447 (appeal taken from Eng.), where a girl who was described as being in a 
near helpless state and was in and out of consciousness, was said not to be required to explicitly 
signal her lack of consent to intercourse.  R. v. Malone, [1998] 2 Crim. App. R. 447, 449 (appeal 
taken from Eng.).  Given that Scots criminal law on rape is lagging behind other jurisdictions 
regarding much needed reform and modernization, it may be the case that such problematic 
decisions are more likely in Scotland than, say, in England and Wales, at least until the reforms 
proposed by the SLC are brought into being. SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION supra note 46. 
 82. R. v. Kaitamaki, [1985] A.C. 147, 151-52 (appeal taken from N.Z.), aff’d [1980] N.Z.L.R. 
59.  Thanks to Victor Tadros for discussion on this point. 
 83. Id. at 151-52. 
 84. Peace v. HMA, [2003] S.C.C.R. 166 (H.C.J.) (Scot.). 
 85. The Scottish term equivalent to the English term complainant. 
 86. Id. at ¶ 7 (per Lord Marnoch). 
 87. Id.  
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direct the jury that a complainer who is in such a state may well not be 
capable of consenting at all.  These cases demonstrate that where a 
woman is intoxicated but not rendered completely unconscious, judges 
are unwilling to give practical guidance on what amounts to incapacity, 
even in individual cases. 
Judicial resistance to the notion that a woman who has been 
drinking could be raped has a long history.  Kim Stevenson documents 
the 19th century roots of the gendered stereotypes underlying 
discriminatory treatment of women who allege rape.88  She notes for 
example that the comment of Mr. Justice Willes in 1856, doubting that 
the offense of rape could be committed “upon the person of a woman 
who had rendered herself perfectly insensible by drink.”89  As 
Stevenson points out, “Modifications of these assumptions have been 
slower to come than changes to formal legal rules.”90  Arguably, the 
relevant issue for the purposes of assessing capacity is the degree of 
intoxication rather than whether or not intoxication was self induced.91  
Where a person is drunk to the point of vomiting and memory black out, 
the reasons for being in such a condition, including the notion of fault in 
bringing it about, is irrelevant to a meaningful understanding of capacity 
to consent.  Consent cannot be unquestioningly assumed (and arguably 
there can rarely be a well founded reasonable belief in consent on the 
part of the defendant) if one party is incapacitated, self-induced or 
otherwise, and communication is compromised, to this degree.  
Stevenson’s argument, that Victorian social expectations about 
appropriate gender roles and behavior continue to influence the way in 
which complainants are treated in rape trials, has significant persuasive 
force when considered in light of the Finch and Munro study, and the 
recent cases discussed in this paper.  For Stevenson, the complainant 
who does not conform to prevailing social norms about gender becomes, 
in the course of the rape trial, a protagonist rather than a victim.  This 
returns us to the issue of the problematic way in which responsibility for 
sexual assault is deeply gendered. 
 88. Kim Stevenson, Unequivocal Victims: The Historical Mystification of the Female 
Complainant in Rape Cases, 8 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 346, 352 (Springer Netherlands 2000).  
 89. Id. (emphasis added). 
 90. Id. at 345. 
 91. That is not to say that the question is completely irrelevant – if the victim was 
involuntarily intoxicated by the defendant, this should have a bearing on his degree of culpability 
for the rape and may also constitute a separate offense, for example administering a substance, or 
assault. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Alan Wertheimer claims that whether or not an intoxicated consent 
is valid is both an empirical and a moral question.  He suggests that: 
The point of respect for autonomy is to give people control over what 
matters to them.  We cannot determine what respecting a woman’s 
autonomy involves until we have a better – empirically grounded – 
understanding of their experience with respect to intoxicated sexual 
relations.92 
This seems to be a plea for more research into the issue of 
intoxicated consent – on women’s experiences of sex when intoxicated 
and perhaps also men’s experiences and perceptions of women’s 
intoxicated consents.  It is not unusual to end a paper with a plea for 
more research.  But it is not enough to claim that intoxication is an 
empirical question that varies from person to person and case to case.  
The protection of women’s bodily integrity and sexual autonomy is also 
a moral question.  There needs to be clearer guidance within the law as 
to the kinds of behaviors that would put triers of fact on notice that 
consent may be invalid due to high levels of intoxication.   
Since the judges appear to be reluctant to give proper guidance on 
(in)capacity, two conclusions should follow.  First, the Judicial Studies 
Board should issue guidelines or model directions for judges on capacity 
in intoxication sexual assault cases, including examples of the kinds of 
factual situations in which consent would be in doubt.  Second, 
Parliament should introduce legislative reforms that would include 
consent given in circumstances of extreme drunkenness as one of the 
situations where consent is not present (or at least, where non-consent is 
rebuttably presumed).  In any case, what is clear is that courts need more 
support and guidance, which is not tainted by discriminatory views 
about appropriate gender behavior, on how to tell the difference between 
someone who is intoxicated to the point of being unable to consent to 
sex, and someone who is drunk and yet retains sufficient capacity to 
consent to sex.  Alongside a statutory based test and guidance on 
capacity, more education and training is required for judges and 
potentially also juries, on the ways in which intoxication can obviate and 
obscure consent in ways which leave women unprotected by the criminal 
law. A further option would be the introduction of specialist sexual 
 92. ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 251-52 (Cambridge University 
Press 2003). 
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offenses courts.93  However, as Rumney and Fenton emphasize, “further 
legislation is not a ‘cure all;’ ”94 alongside these changes we do need to 
know more about women’s views and experiences of intoxicated sex, as 
well as asking why it is that men want to have sex with women who are 
extremely drunk to the point of vomiting.  We also need to continue to 
address the issue of responsibility for sexual activity, as well as the 
prejudices and biases around women’s responsibility for attacks 
perpetrated upon them while they are voluntarily intoxicated.  
Unfortunately, the criminal law is not well suited to such a task. 
 93. Such specialist courts have been introduced in South Africa – for discussion see for 
example, Stephen P. Walker & Dap A. Louw, The South African Court for Sexual Offences, 26 
INT’L J.L & PSYCHIATRY 73 (2003). 
 94. Rumney & Fenton, supra note 51. 
